There is a certain measure of absurdity that occurs when a finite being seeks to understand the infinite God. The inquiry is no simple matter. God’s infinite nature transcends the finite and linear nature of human beings. Such a pursuit touches every major philosophical, theological, religious, and epistemic field of knowledge. The study of God and his attributes is a complex endeavor and is often accomplished by examining individual aspects of the nature or essence of God, or by considering the way in which God interacts with his creation. One classic question centers on God’s omniscience, and what it means for God to know the future of particular persons and events (i.e., foreknowledge).

The question of divine foreknowledge tethers together God’s omniscience and human free will. For example, why would God create the universe if God was aware more people would be lost eternally rather than saved? As one person asked in an online discussion, “Why go through on something knowing in advance that it is a bad investment?” The question presumes there is a logical inconsistency between an all-loving God and the reality of suffering and chaos in the world.

Some contemporary theologians have argued that God’s foreknowledge is limited and can only account for what can be actually known. This theory has various labels, but is commonly called, “Open Theism.” Among 19th-century Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement personas, Thomas Wesley Brents (1823–1905) argued that God’s foreknowledge is limited to what can be actually known. Brents’s viewpoint is set forth in his sermon, “Foreknowledge of God,” set forth in his classic anthology of sermons, The Gospel Plan of Salvation (1874). Brents was a well-respected nineteenth-century North American “pioneer” preacher of the Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement. In short, Brents argued that unlimited foreknowledge lacks biblical consistency.

I dispute this conclusion. There are many presuppositions that underpin the argument of Brents’s sermon, “Foreknowledge of God.” This paper offers a refutation of his thesis that God does not have unlimited foreknowledge. I argue that God knows all that is possible to be known and that this foreknowledge does not interfere with human free will.

Statement of the Problem

Unlimited foreknowledge is asserted on the basis of three basic arguments. First, the Bible describes God as knowing everything there is to know. Second, God knows everything there is to know without infringing upon human freedom. Third, God is essentially outside of time and cannot be confined by linear constructs as human existence is.

In “Foreknowledge,” however, Brents posed what is a fair question:

may we not, then, with becoming reverence, inquire whether or not God eternally foreknew every thing that ever has or ever will come to pass?[1]

In The Gospel Plan of Salvation, “Foreknowledge” is part of the opening series of sermons Brents delivers against John Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, election and reprobation, hereditary depravity, and the doctrine of Universalism (i.e., all souls will be saved).[2] Brents principally attacked the fundamental basis for the two systems of belief; namely:

the assumption that God, from all eternity, foreknew every thing that ever has or ever will come to pass; therefore, He foreknew just who and how many would be saved, and who, if any, would be lost.[2]

For Brents, “such foreknowledge amounted to an immutable decree” in which “man had no power to avert” this foreknown destiny. Brents argues that such a position violates human agency.[3] He then sets forth a series of arguments that follow a somewhat sequential order, building upon one another.

He concedes that this study can only appropriately operate if it is recognized that finite humanity has mental limitations and can only understand God as God has revealed himself.[4] Brents cautiously affirms:

We may know God’s will, and the extent of His knowledge where He has revealed them to us, but beyond this we dare not go. When God speaks, it is the province of man to hear and believe, whether he can or can not [sic] see to the end.[5]

Then he moves to argue against God having unlimited foreknowledge on account that there are passages that appear to demonstrate that God was unaware of certain things, such as the depravity of the pre-flood population of Earth (Gen 6:5). Brents forwards his argumentation by means of the analogy of omnipotence, pondering that “if there are some things which God can not do, though omnipotent, may there not be some things which He DID not know, though omniscient?”; consequently, infinite knowledge does not require that he knows everything.[6]

Brents acknowledges that this may be accounted for on the grounds of accommodation, and provides his definition of accommodation and its limits. Accommodation must embody the same thought from whatever source it is being transferred from and should the thought be different then it is a form of deception, conveying “one thought when he designed to convey another.”[7]

The next line of reasoning is Brents’ “all” argument, where he observes that while Scriptures teach that God and Jesus know “all things,” the word “all” may “indicate a great amount or a great number, when it must not be understood without limit.”[8] In his conclusion, Brents maintains that God only knows for sure that which He has decreed to be an absolute certainty, and is unaware of those things he has decreed to be contingent realities.[9]

First, the Bible describes God as knowing everything there is to know.

Preliminary to evaluating the biblical data, a brief definition of what is meant here is that God knows everything there is to know. That God knows everything there is to know is to say that God is omniscient. Omniscience comes from two words, omnis, “all,” and scire, which means, “know”; consequently, it means knowledge of everything – a perfect knowledge.[10] God has perfect knowledge of the past, the present, and the future from the human point of view; furthermore, if God has perfect knowledge of the future, then this suggests that God has foreknowledge. This aspect of God’s omniscience specifically focuses on God knowing the future acts as if they were already done.[11] Interestingly, Casper W. Hodge observes that God’s omniscience is frequently connected with His omnipresence” (2 Chron 16:9, Pro 15:3, Psa 139).[12] These concepts will be further embellished as Brents’s specific lines of contention are addressed.

Old Testament evidence suggests that God is omniscient. Notice an example from the Exodus where God revealed the future of Abraham’s offspring in Egyptian bondage (Gen 15:13–15). When Moses is called, God is prepared to deliver them from this servitude (Exod 3:8–9), but Moses is warned that Pharaoh will harden his heart and not let the Israelites go easily (Exod 7:14) until the last plague is sent upon Egypt (Exod 11:1).[13] God was fully aware of the future events, and this assurance that God knew what would happen was a vital part of the confidence of Moses, as were the miraculous abilities and supernatural experiences he had gone through (Exod 3:4–6, 4:1–17).

New Testament evidence likewise provides strength to the picture that God is omniscient. An example from this group of canonical material is found in 2 Peter. One scholar reflects upon this material in light of omniscience and free will and points out: “Divine revelation as it is expressed in 2 Peter does not present a God who is learning, relenting, at times taken by surprise or retracting his eternal counsel.”[14] 2 Peter 3:14–18, as suggested by Neyrey, reflects the “themes and issues raised” from the beginning of the letter.[15] Edmond Hiebert likewise notes this connection based upon dió (“therefore”) in 3:14 and suggests two points: “these exhortations are based on what has been written” so far; and the author insists, “that the link between faith and conduct must be maintained” in light of the coming judgment.[16] This observation is vital in light of the heretical religio-philosophical school of thought under attack in 2 Peter 2:1–3:13. Thomas R. Schreiner, observes:

Peter’s argument is not pragmatic […] he did not invent the idea of a future judgment to foster ethical living now. On the contrary, the day of the Lord, consisting of both judgment and salvation, was bedrock reality for him. On the basis of this reality, believers are exhorted to godliness.[17]

This moral argument is given weight and authority throughout 3:14–18 in three ways: the inspired revealer of God’s knowledge reminds his audience of the coming judgment which is sure  (3:14–15a).[18] God knows the future outcome of these false teachers and those who live immorally; therefore, “what manner of persons ought you to be in holy conduct and godliness” (3:11).

Brents’ attack is really quite simple: God is omniscient, but he only knows what can be known and what respects the free moral agency of humanity. This would necessitate that there are some things that God cannot know – which are the future actions of mortals. As an example of this, he cites Genesis 6:5–6 where the Bible says:

Then the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the Lord was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and he was grieved in his heart.

Brents asks why state that God “saw” the world bankrupt of morality if it was not new from God’s perspective?[19] “Why did God grieve over a result which was as plain to Him before He created man as when He saw the overt acts of wickedness performed?” Again he asks, “Could there be anything unknown to him whose understanding is infinite?”[20] Brents believe there is, and here is his argument; which is somewhat analogous to the attribute of omnipotence; observe, 

if there are some things which God can not do, though omnipotent, may there not be some things which He DID not know, though omniscient?”[21]

“God is as infinite in power as He is in understanding. No one, we suppose, will deny that He is omnipotent as well as omniscient, yet there are some things He can not do; e.g., God can not lie [….]” because they are inconsistent with his other attributes and the free agency of man.[22] Therefore, Brents’s reasons,

He did not know, before making man, just how wicked he would be, simply because such foreknowledge would have been incompatible with the free agency and responsibility of man. To be a responsible man must be free.”[23]

Any knowledge of future events, says Brents is equivocal to an immutable decree that cannot be averted, thus there is no freedom to “falsify” God’s foreknowledge –hence where is the freedom.[24]

In response to Brents, several things may be said. First, it is believed that too high a premium has been made upon a small sampling of Scripture that employs accommodative language, depicting God as repentant for making humanity. Brents argues that the accommodative language argument is fallacious, however, for two reasons: accommodations must embody the same thought. The other reason is that if the same thought is not employed then some form of deception is being undertaken, conveying, “one thought when he designed to convey another.”[25] Brents takes it one step further and suggests that God could have said that He knew from the beginning that man would fall and that he was not surprised by man’s spiral into immorality. The problem with this is that it does not square with the rest of the biblical evidence, a sample of which has been demonstrated above. Furthermore, as Hodge observes:

It is true that the Scripture makes use of anthropomorphic forms of expression as regards the way in which God obtains knowledge (Gen 11:5; 18:21); nevertheless the constant representation of the Scripture is that God knows everything. This perfect knowledge of God, moreover, is not merely a knowledge which is practically unlimited for all religious purposes, but is omniscience in the strictest sense of the term.[26]

Furthermore, as will be developed later God is outside of time God does not live a linear life where life “exists of moments following one another,” C.S. Lewis observes.[27] There is a genuine anthropomorphic accommodation (i.e. “God is described in human terms”) when God reacts sadly to the fall of man, as instantaneously as humans would, demonstrating both concern and contempt for sin.[28]

Second, God may know everything there is to know without infringing upon human freedom.

Brents is very clear that if God knows everything including the future events of humans, then that goes against free agency. He argues that if God knows a thing then it is as sure as an immutable decree. The problem Brents has with this analogy is that while the force of both foreknowledge and an immutable decree may be similar in that the future cannot be changed, the latter has participation in selecting one’s future destiny; whereas, with the former, it is simply a matter of knowing, not a matter of imposing a certain destiny. Hence the argument Brents articulate is quite problematic, for one of his major premises is crippled. Though we would not agree with everything said by Arthur Pink, he makes a good observation relative to this point:

It should, however, be pointed out that neither God’s knowledge nor His cognition of the future, considered simply in themselves, are causative. Nothing has ever come to pass, or ever will, merely because God knew it. The cause of all things is the will of God.[29]

In keeping with the critique of Brents, Pink’s observation likewise contributes to the credibility of the notion that knowledge is not causative. Simply because a person may know how an engine works, does not imply that this person is responsible for all engines everywhere to function. It simply means that this person knows what will occur under the present circumstances. Therefore, taking this limited illustration to a divine scale, God knows all the circumstances and what will happen under those circumstances, but does not decree that they occur in the sense of direct cause for it to occur. Humans are still left with their free agency intact.

Third, God is outside of time, and cannot be confined by linear constructs as human existence is.

Perhaps the greatest flaw in Brents’s argument is the implied presupposition that God acts in a linear existence as man does. Part of this has to do with Brents’ view of the biblical statements, for example, consider the case of Abraham offering Isaac (Gen 22:12). The text says that when Abraham went to sacrifice Isaac, God through an angel said, “Do not lay your hand on the lad, or do anything to him; for now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld you son, your only son, from Me.” Brents responds to this passage as follows:

What can this mean? “Now I know that thou fearest God.” Did He always know it? Nay, how did He then know it? “Seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me.” Does not this language imply that God saw in Abraham a degree of faithfulness unseen before?[30]

Indeed, from the surface it appears to be the case, and honestly, there is a sense that God did experience something new about Abraham, for Woods writes that the phrase “Now I know” suggests the idea that God now knew “by experience.”[31] This would imply that there is a difference between God foreknowing a thing, and then actually experiencing it; which furthermore demonstrates that knowing and the action are mutually exclusive. Yet Brents asks, in light of Hebrews 11:7, where this was design to “try” Abraham,  “How then could God try Abraham if He knew Abraham would past the test”? Brents then argues that in order to be a true accommodation, Abraham should have been to whom this statement was addressed: “Now you know” what kind of faithful service you can render to God, for “an accommodation of language to thought would require a change like this”[32] But as noticed above, God is outside of time.

Returning to the aspect of God living in a non-linear – outside of time – environment, C. S. Lewis provides helpful information. He writes:

How could He [God] at the same time be God who knows everything and also a man asking his disciples “Who touched me?” You will notice that the sting lay in the time words: “While He was a baby” – “How could He at the same time?” In other words I was assuming that Christ’s life as God was in time, and that His life as the man Jesus in Palestine was a shorter period taken out of that time […][33]

But Brents argues that since Christ had a limited foreknowledge of future events (time of his return Mark 13:32), then it means that God in heaven may have a limited foreknowledge of future events. He makes this leap of argumentation:

It is one thing to know all things, and quite another to foreknow all things –one thing to know a thing, and quite another thing to know a thing before it is a thing, or when it has no existence.[34]

Then he says that the term “all” in all things may “indicate a great amount or a great number, when it must not be understood without limit.”[35] Brents moves to say that since all has this meaning, as demonstrated in his examples (all the people were baptized by John, though many rejected him; John’s audience only knew that which John was writing about; love does not believe lies though it believes all things), “then we shall continue to believe that our Heavenly Father had power to limit the exercise of His foreknowledge to an extent compatible with the free-agency and accountability of man and the scheme of salvation devised for him, until we are shown a more excellent way.”[36]

The problem here is simple. Brents assumes that Christ on earth shares the same omniscience as God in Heaven, but this is not so. Particularly is this true when Christ affirms that God knows certain future events that the Son did not; for example, the establishment of the kingdom (Acts 1:6–8). More specifically though, when the Word became flesh and dwelt among mortals, He emptied himself of certain qualities that he shared while being with the Father in Heaven. Philippians 2:5–8 reads as follows:

Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, who, being in the form of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation, taking the form of a bondservant, and coming in the likeness of men. And being found in appearance as a man, He humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death, even the death of the cross.

All that Brents may argue from Mark 13:32 is that Jesus had limited foreknowledge, which is consistent with his departure from heaven to take upon human appearance. Furthermore, Brents’ discussion and argumentation cannot extend to God in heaven, since the Father and the Holy Spirit never divested themselves as Christ did. Consequently, Brents’ argument against the foreknowledge of God does not stand.

Conclusion

At first glance it appears that Brents offers a strong case as he moves from position to position, setting forth his claim that the classical concept of God’s foreknowledge is flawed, and that God’s knowledge is only about things that can be known, and that such things must occur in order for him to know. However, in the process of his argumentation, it appears that Brents is flawed in several particulars. Although Brents argues that unlimited foreknowledge is unbiblical, it is maintained in this paper that unlimited foreknowledge is biblical.

The basis for this assertion lies in three lines of reasoning. First, the Bible describes God as knowing everything there is to know. Second, God may know everything there is to know without infringing upon human freedom. Third, God is outside of time, and cannot be confined by linear constructs as human existence is. With these things in mind, we close this discussion.

Endnotes

1. T. W. Brents, “Foreknowledge of God,” The Gospel Plan of Salvation, 17th ed. (1874; Repr., Bowling Green, KY: Guardian of Truth Foundation, 1987), 75. All italics are original to the text of the sermon unless otherwise noted as “emphasis added” (i.e., emph. added).
2. Brents, Gospel Plan, “Predestination” (7–12), “Election and Reprobation” (13–40), “Calvinistic Proofs Examined” (41–73), “The Foreknowledge of God” (74–87), and “Hereditary Depravity” (88–116).
3. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 74.
4. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 74–75.
5. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 75.
6. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 76.
7. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 77.
8. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 79.
9. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 84.
10. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 85–87.
11. Charles Hartshorne, “Omniscience,” Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), 546.
12. Charles Hartshorne, “Foreknowledge, Divine,” Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), 284.
13. Casper W. Hodge, “Foreknow, Foreknowledge,” ISBE 2:1128.
14. Hodge, “Foreknow, Foreknowledge,” 1128.
15. J. Daryl Charles, “The Language of Providence in 2 Peter: Some Considerations for the ‘Open Theism’ Debate,” Presbyterion 29 (2003): 86.
16. Charles, “The Language of Providence in 2 Peter,” 247.
17. D. Edmond Hiebert, “Selected Studies from 2 Peter Part 4: Directives for Living in Dangerous Days: An Exposition of 2 Peter 3:14-18a,” BSac 141 (1984): 331.
18. Thomas R. Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude (Nashville: Broadman, 2003), 393; see also, Richard J. Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter (Waco, TX: Word Publishing, 1983), 334, and Luke T. Johnson, The Writings of the New Testament: An Interpretation (Philadelphia:  Fortress, 1986), 449.
19. Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 334.
20. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 76.
21. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 76.
22. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 77.
23. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 76–77.
24. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 77.
25. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 74.
26. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 79.
27. Hodge, “Foreknow, Foreknowledge,” 1128.
28. C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, rev. ed. (1952; repr., New York: Macmillan, 1960), 146.
29. Wayne Jackson, “Anthropomorphism,” Bible Words and Theological Terms Made Easy (Stockton, CA: Courier Publications, 2002), 8; Clyde M. Woods, Genesis-Exodus (Henderson, TN: Woods Publications, 1972), 17.
30. Arthur Pink, The Attributes of God (1930; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 20.
31. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 80.
32. Woods, Genesis-Exodus, 56.
33. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 80.
34. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 147.
35. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 83.
36. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 84.
37. Brents, “Foreknowledge,” 84.

Works Cited

Bauckham, Richard J. Jude, 2 Peter. WBC 50. Edited by David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker. Waco, TX: Word Publishing, 1983.

Brents, T.W. “The Foreknowledge of God.” Pages 74–87 in The Gospel Plan of Salvation. 17th ed. 1874. Repr., Bowling Green, KY: Guardian of Truth Foundation, 1987.

Charles, J. Daryl. “The Language of Providence in 2 Peter: Some Considerations for the ‘Open Theism’ Debate.” Presbyterion 29 (2003): 85–93.

Hartshorne, Charles. “Foreknowledge, Divine.” Page 284 in Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945.

_____. “Omniscience.” Pages 546–47 in Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945.

Hiebert, D. Edmond. “Selected Studies from 2 Peter Part 4: Directives for Living in Dangerous Days: An Exposition of 2 Peter 3:14-18a.” BSac 141 (1984): 330–40.

Hodge, Caspar Wistar. “Foreknow, Foreknowledge.” Pages 1128–31 in vol. 2 of The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia. Edited by James Orr. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1946.

Jackson, Wayne. Bible Words and Theological Terms Made Easy. Stockton, CA: Courier, 2002.

Johnson, Luke T. The Writings of the New Testament:  An Interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1986.

Lanier, Sr., Roy H. The Timeless Trinity for the Ceaseless Centuries. Denver, CO: Lanier Publishing, 1974.

Lewis, C. S. Mere Christianity. Revised edition. 1952. Repr., New York: Macmillan, 1960.

Neyrey, Jerome H. 2 Peter, Jude:  A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB 37C. Edited by William F. Albright and David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 1993.

Pink, Arthur W. The Attributes of God. 1930. Repr., Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2002.

Schreiner, Thomas R. 1, 2 Peter, Jude. NAC 37. Edited by E. Ray Clendenen. Nashville, TN: Broadman, 2003.

Woods, Clyde M. Genesis-Exodus. People’s Old Testament Notes. Vol. 1. Henderson, TN: Woods Publications, 1972.

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