Does God Exist?

There is no greater worldview question that divides humans so sharply than the following: does God exist? As a Christian, I believe there are many good reasons to assert that God does exist. This short piece offers a brief overview of these arguments for the existence of the Christian God.

The Case for the Christian God

The average Christian may think arguing for the existence of God is straightforward, but this is where we must get more specific. There are many worldview definitions of God/god that are distinct from how Christians have historically defined their Creator. Additionally, sometimes arguments for the existence of God only point to reasons to believe that a god exits, but not necessarily the God of the Christian faith. This is important because as a Christian casemaker, we do not merely argue that there are good reasons to believe a god exists, but that the God of the resurrected Christ exists.

For example, the apostle Paul employs well accepted natural theology to the Greek polytheistic mind and affirms this God resurrected Jesus Christ. In Athens, Paul affirms that the God of Israel (monotheism) is the god who is unknown to them in any specific detail (Acts 17:16, 22–23). They have knowledge of God in general terms: creator of the universe and mankind, manager of the world, and moral law giver (Acts 17:24–31a). This God will call all to moral account through Jesus, and he assures this expectation on the grounds of the resurrection of Jesus (Acts 17:31b). With this move, Paul excludes all other gods.

Step One: Arguments for the Existence of God

Arguments from nature provide good reasons to believe in the existence of God. They do not stand or fall together, but they do provide a cumulative case for the reasonableness of the Christian worldview. The following groups (or families) of arguments are used to make this case. I will offer a simplistic definition for each and then provide an example or two of how they make their case.

Cosmological Arguments: the existence of the universe demands a cause, whether natural (random) or supernatural (intelligent). As Baxter reminds us, “the argument is based upon the general, universal observation that ‘Nothing comes from nothing’” (I Believe Because…, 53). There must be a cause. Being careful with our words, it is more accurate to say “nothing [physical, material] comes from nothing.” Here’s why. Some things do exist necessarily. The field of mathematics reveals that numbers, mathematical sets or entities are not caused by something else. But things like people, planets, galaxies depend on other forces to exist (Craig, On Guard, 56–57). Physical things are contingent on past forces and cannot exist by themselves. As Ralph Gilmore says, these are “iffy” things that only exist “if” certain events or states occurred. Otherwise, you are left with a series of never-ending origin stories–an equally challenging miracle!

The cosmological argument makes its case from effect (the cosmos) to a necessary cause (God). There are both narrow and broad forms of this argument. Thomas B. Warren in debate with atheistic philosopher Antony Flew (1976) argued the narrow form, affirming that the first human came about either by evolutionary forces or by supernatural means. The apostle Paul employs the broad form when he argues that the material things of the world that make plain that there is an invisible, powerful, and divine God who created the world (Romans 1:19–20). Another broad form is known as the KALAM cosmological argument. In short, the argument goes as follow: whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore, the universe has a cause. This ultimate cause is not contingent, nor impossible, but necessary. We call this necessary cause God.

Teleological Arguments: the presence of design in, or of, the universe demands that the design have a designer who employed intelligent agency. As an argument from empirical evidence, the argument moves from a design to an intelligent agent. The process has an intuitive aspect to it, making it a very accessible family of arguments. Nevertheless, the secular worldview explains apparent design as the result of “enough time and some luck”–certainly not the result of intelligent agency. It is important then to be clear on how to identify intelligent agency in the form of design.

To illustrate, the fine-tuning of the universe argument affirms that the cosmos is life-permitting in the most basic scientific sense: “organisms […] take in food, extract energy from it, grow, adapt to their environment, and reproduce” (Craig, 110). This reality implies a Fine-Tuner. But could this be the result of chance and time? Is this feature necessary to the universe? How do we distinguish between these options? On pure naturalism there is nothing necessary to the universe that requires it to be life-permitting. To the contrary, any potential life-permitting universe is “fantastically improbable.” Instead, a life-prohibiting universe is far more likely. The odds are so bad against a fine-tuned universe we should believe the system was rigged (Craig, 112–20).

Thus, the evidence of a fine-tunned universe points to its Fine-Tuner. It is not the result (contingent) of unintelligent processes, neither can chance explain its complexity, and it exhibits specific patterns characteristic of intelligence (Dembski, Intelligent Design, 127–49). As a watch, a camera, or a painting point to their intelligent agent, so the eye, the human body, the life-permitting features of the universe point to its Intelligent Agent, whom we call God.

Moral Arguments: based on the moral order of the human experience, the Cause of this moral order must be moral and its lawgiver (God). The argument observes a fundamental reality of the human social experience, the expectation of moral obligation. Regardless of worldview we all seem to play by the same rule, there are things you “ought to do,” and there are things you “ought not to do.” This holds even when there is disagreement over specific “oughts.” It has been well said,

Wherever man is found, he is convinced there is a difference between good and evil. Men may differ as to where to make the distinction between good and evil, but all men agree that such a distinction is to be made.”

Bales, The Law in the Heart, 56

The human experience is conscious of an objective moral law; objective moral laws imply a moral lawgiver; therefore, there must be a supreme moral lawgiver (Geisler and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 16).

Morality is a transcendent reality, not centered within a person. The conscience may have subjective elements but ultimately, moral obligations are not personal preferences. For example, why are hate crimes against women (kidnapping, sex-trafficking, etc.) objectively wrong and not personal preferences? Or, consider how the center of moral justice has shifted towards one’s subjective “psychological self” (truth) from which the moral imperative is to liberate oneself from all oppressive (evil) power structures (Trueman, Strange New World, 157). Even here the rules are the same, something is wrong in the objective world. External, transcendent moral obligations exist grounded in an objective reality point to the Giver of this moral code.

Ontological Argument: God is a necessary being, not a contingent being, and the cause of all contingent things. The argument is based on the very concept of the being of God, it is not directly based on empirical evidence as the previous arguments (cause, design, moral). Some regard this as the weakest argument for God because it depends heavily on abstract thinking. However, it has the same logic behind believing that mathematical items, like numbers, necessarily exist. Nevertheless, it relies on the likelihood that God exists (from evidence in the world). Thus, if God exists, he necessarily exists as the First Uncaused Cause (“God is”).

Step Two: From God to Christianity

Presently, we have surveyed arguments for the existence of God. From this general case for God can a specific case for the God of the Christian Faith be made? The above arguments help us to make certain measured expectations about God. God is: infinite, singular and powerful (cosmological); intelligent, powerful with deep knowledge (teleological); personal and relational, loving and holy (moral); transcendent, great and eternal (ontological). It is reasonable to suggest that such a God would likely seek to have a relationship with his creation and this activity may be identifiable in history in supernatural ways.

Of all the various world religions which exist, the Christian faith provides the most evidential and testable historical claim that “Jesus of Nazareth [was] crucified and killed [and] God raised him up” from the dead (Acts 2:22–24; 17:32; 25:19). The historical figure of Jesus is well attested by early non-Christian sources, including the circumstances of his death by crucifixion (Tacitus, Annals 15.44; Josephus, Antiquities 18.63–64, 116–17; 20.200). The earliest Christian claim asserted that Jesus was resurrected bodily and appeared to his disciples, and to skeptics and hostile unbelievers who converted to the faith (1 Corinthians 15:1–8).

Although many naturalistic explanations have been offered to account for the rise of the Christian faith, none have the explanatory force of the historical claim that Jesus rose from the dead by the power of God.

Conclusion

Does God exist? There are very good reasons to believe so. We must, however, take this a step further and affirm that there are very good reasons to believe that the God who rose Jesus from the dead exists.

Works Cited

Bales, James D. The Law Within Their Heart. Dallas, TX: Gospel Teachers Publications, 1981.

Baxter, Batsell Barrett. I Believe Because… A Study of the Evidence Supporting Christian Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1971.

Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision. Colorado Springs, CO: Cook, 2010.

Dembski, William A. Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1999.

Geisler, Norman L., and Ronald M. Brooks. When Skeptics Ask: A Handbook on Christian Evidences. Revised ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2013.

Trueman, Carl R. Strange New World: How Thinkers and Activists Redefined Identity and Sparked the Sexual Revolution. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2022.

This article originally appeared in The Carolina Messenger. To subscribe for FREE click here. There are slight edits in this version.


The Humanity of Jesus the Son

The phrases Jesus Christ, the Christ of faith, the Jesus of history, and Jesus the Divine Son all reflect significant themes pertaining to the central figure of the New Testament, Jesus of Nazareth. These concepts fall within a specialized area of theology known as Christology, which is a systematic “study of Christ” based on the full biblical picture derived from scripture.

A bit more formally, this field of study speaks to the Christian endeavor to map Jesus’ placement within “time and eternity, humanity and divinity, particularity and universality.” It answers how the life of a seemingly benign first-century Jewish rabbi could be so “relevant for all people and all times” (McGrath 2017, 207).

The present discussion maps Jesus’ Son-relationship in the triune unity of God, and the nature of his humanity. It then reflects on how the humanity of Jesus is relevant to the Christian’s personal walk before God.

Jesus the Son and the Trinity

The Trinitarian Formula

The divinity of Jesus is established in many passages of the New Testament. For example, Matthew closes with an appearance of Jesus where he affirms his authority “in heaven and on earth.” With this authority, he commissions his disciples for an international burden,

“Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (28:18–19 NRSV). [All Scripture references are from the New Revised Standard Version unless otherwise noted.]

Three themes are clear in this passage: Jesus’ divine authority, discipleship made in baptism, and the trinitarian language of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In the early generations of the church, the above trinitarian formula would represent a highly nuanced concept of monotheism affirmed to be in continuity with the “one God” of the Hebrew Bible.

What forced early Jewish Christians to accept this nuanced view of monotheism? The answer: the character and nature of Jesus did. It is not subversive of the “oneness” of God (Deut 6:4) but depends on the New Testament’s clarification that the “one God” is not a simplistic model. As the clarification argues, the Divine Son is not God the Father, nor is he the Holy Spirit. This raises tough questions that the historical church has discussed in earnest and in conflict for generations.

How do we map this out theologically?

The Divine Son Portrayed

We turn to the presence of Jesus and how He is portrayed in relation to the Father and the Holy Spirit.

In the first century, the prologue to the Fourth Gospel (John 1:1–3, 14) affirms that the person and nature of Jesus is the driving force to reshape the whole biblical landscape of the concept of God (Gen 1:1; Exod 20:11).

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being... And the Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and truth. (John 1:1–3a, 14) 

Jesus not only pre-existed as the lógos at the time of creation (John 1:1), but he also “emptied” (ekénōsen) himself to take on the “form [morphē] of a slave”—a human (Phil 2:6–7). Leaning heavily on John 1:14, the Alexandrian theologian, Athanasius, concluded that this “human body” was taken by this same “Word of God” (Placher 2003, 184).

On this view, there was no room within this theology for Arius’ affirmation that Jesus the Son—the Word—was a created being who subsequently became divine. This view reduced Jesus to a creature impotent to redeem humanity (McGrath 2017, 217–19).

The Divine Association

As McGrath (2017, 214) chronicles, the divinity of Christ was one of the first major theological battles of the early church as it sought to hammer out its understanding of the contours of a very genuine human being in Jesus who, at the same time, was portrayed as being more than a mere human. The “battle” was not over the deity of Christ as such (that was established), but how to understand the relationship between his humanity and his divinity.

The divinity of Jesus was therefore accepted as true as his humanity—as affirmed in Chalcedon (AD 451)—which means that the question left to map out was the relationship between Jesus and the Father and the Holy Spirit.

The only way to do this is by evaluating Scripture (Jenson 2003, 194). Despite certain reservations, Jenson argues clearly that Peter’s application of the divine title “Lord” from Joel 2 (kyrios LXX) to Jesus in Acts 2:33–34 (kyrios) demonstrates that

the risen Christ, without violation of God’s singularity, does what only the God of Israel himself does, and that he does this precisely by virtue of his situation with the God of Israel. (2003, 194)

Jensen in Essentials of Christian Theology (2003)

Jensen points out that the emerging notion of association that comes from the word “with” points to the “inescapably observable fact” that the biblical narrative is framed by three divine characters in its drama (2003, 195): the God of Israel, Jesus his Son, and the life-giving Spirit of God.

Agreeing with Jenson (2003, 196), Jesus should not be viewed as a mere successive mode of God’s presence in time (modalism) or as the Father’s subordinate agent with the Spirit in time (subordinationism). Instead, Jesus maintains an eternally mutual and reciprocal relationship with the Father and the Spirit. For this reason, ancient Christians used an analogy inspired by the theater, that is to say, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit although three in persona (mask) are one in Divine substance. Another model is found in Martin Buber’s I-You relationship model (McGrath 2017,179–80).

Understanding the Humanity of Jesus

What, then, goes into mapping this theological tension of the Son and the Trinity?

Mapping the nature of Jesus’ humanity—in balance with his divinity—requires great caution. The traditional doctrine of the incarnation (literally, “becoming bodily”) affirms both the full humanity of Jesus and his divinity. Any attempt to isolate what is organically interwoven in the person and work of Jesus runs a high risk of distortion.

Overcompensating to account for the humanity of Jesus has typically been met with the “stamp” of heresy. Three, in particular, are Ebionism, Arianism, and Docetism (McGrath 2017, 214–20). 

The roots of Ebionism are Jewish. It framed Jesus through the lenses of a human prophet, as called and anointed by the Holy Spirit. As a low Christology, Jesus is only a “spiritually superior” human. This does not align with the picture of his eternal pre-existence as Creator.

Plotted on another point on the map is Arianism (named after Arius), which called into question the “fully divine” and “fully human” affirmation due to an irreconcilable application of the Greek notion of divine impassability and the doctrine of the incarnation. God cannot be both changeable (fully human) and transcendent (fully divine), therefore, the incarnation strikes at the perfect nature of the one God. Jesus must therefore be a “superior created being” with nothing divine to report. This failed to account for the actual testimony of the gospels where in fact this is possible.

Meanwhile, Docetism affirmed, with its hardline separation of God and the present evil world of matter (due to its gnostic foundation), the divine incarnation of John 1:14 was nothing more than “pretend.” The heresy’s name (or tendency) is derived from the Greek word dokéō (“to seem”) affirming Jesus only “seemed” to have a body in which he suffered and died, making the incarnation “into a fake” (Placher 2003, 183). Scripturally, the work of Christ is dependent on the fully human (Luke 24:38–39) and fully divine Jesus manifested in the death of the cross and resurrection from the dead (Rom 1:3–4).

Similarly, the opening line of 1 John affirms the humanity of the “Word of Life”: “what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands” (1:1).

Likewise, in the second century CE, Ignatius of Antioch (ca. 35–ca. 110) stressed his concern to the Christians of Trallia that they should guard against (“be deaf,” kōphóthēte 9.1) anything which undermines the humanity of Christ with the following words:

Jesus Christ, who was of the family of David, who was the son of Mary; who really was born, who both ate and drank; who really was persecuted under Pontius Pilate, who really was crucified and died while those in heaven and on earth and under the earth look on; who, moreover, really was raised from the dead when his Father raised him up, who—his Father, that is—in the same way will likewise also raise us up in Christ Jesus who believe in him, apart from whom we have no true life. (“To the Trallians” 9.1–2)

Ignatius of Antioch, “To the Trallians” 9.1-2

The example of Ignatius is interesting because it is early and strongly affirms Jesus’ human form, “who really” (hos alethōs) an adverb repeated four times to assert what is true, actual because it corresponds to what is really so (BDAG 44). For Ignatius, Jesus actually was born, ate and drank, persecuted, crucified and died, and raised from the dead. Ignatius saw denying the humanity of Christ as subversive to the soteriological (the saving, redeeming) and eschatological (end times, fulfilling) work of Christ.

What Does This Mean?

What then does it mean for the Christian that God became flesh to redeem us in the person of Jesus Christ? Two extremes must be cautioned against here. One extreme is to moralize the life of Jesus (1 Pet 2:21), and as such reduces Jesus to a mere good teacher. Another extreme is to make Jesus’ life and teaching into a disjointed symbolic presence of God (i.e., Paul Tillich).

The humanity of Jesus provides me with a great deal of assurance as a believer that God knows through Christ the human plight. Jesus has “assumed all” and can, therefore “heal all” of humanity (Placher 2003, 184). When the “name” Immanuel (“God is with us”) is given to Jesus (Matt 1:23) the associated promise is that “he will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21). God’s presence in the human child to be born provides a personal locus that can be isolated to time, space, and history.

For all humans, it then becomes quite clear that God is joining the human continuum to reconcile not only “us” but also “the world to himself” in Christ (2 Cor 5:18–19). Paul’s application has massive personal repercussions,

“if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!” (5:17) 

The humanity of Jesus is not simply a modal expression of God, but God entering into time and space to save, forgive, reconcile, and renew humanity and creation.

It provides the seedbed to take the particular localized Jesus and affirm his enduring value for all humans for all time. As Ignatius wrote, God “will likewise also raise us up in Christ Jesus who believe in him, apart from whom we have no true life” (“To the Trallians” 9.2).

Truly, the humanity of the God-Man Jesus is relevant for the Christian’s personal walk before God because it is the seedbed for all our hopes, especially, hope for the resurrection (1 Cor 15:12–19).

Bibliography

(BDAG) Bauer, Walter, Frederick W. Danker, W. F. Ardnt, and F. W. Gingrich. 2000. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Ignatius. 1999. “The Letters of Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch.” Pages 128–201 in The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations. 2d edition. Edited and revised by Michael W. Holmes. Grand Rapids: Baker Books.

Jenson, Robert W. 2003. “Does Jesus Make a Difference? The Person and Work of Jesus Christ” Pages 191–205 in Essentials of Christian Theology. Edited by William C. Placher. Louisville, Kent: Westminster John Knox.

McGrath, Alister E. 2017. Christian Theology: An Introduction. 6th edition. Maldon, Ma: Wiley Blackwell.

Placher, William C. 2003. “Does Jesus Make a Difference? The Person and Work of Jesus Christ” Pages 183–91 in Essentials of Christian Theology. Edited by William C. Placher. Louisville, Kent: Westminster John Knox.

Did Paul Hallucinate the Resurrection?

[Note: This paper has been published. Go to the end of the article to download the published version.]

The historical bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is the foundation of orthodox Christianity. The apostle Paul asserts, “if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain” (1 Cor 15:14).[1] One argument skeptics, like former Catholic Priest and Jesus Seminar scholar John Dominic Crossan, use to counter the force of the historical claim of a bodily resurrection of Jesus is to say that the early Christians experienced hallucinations.

I intend to demonstrate the early Christian claim of Jesus appearing bodily after his resurrection­, as reflected in Paul, is the best explanation for the resurrection appearances of the New Testament over Crossan’s hallucination theory.

I first critique the hallucination theory of Crossan for contradicting the bodily resurrection language of the New Testament. Second, I demonstrate how Crossan’s trance mechanism for a hallucination imposes an anachronistic understanding on Paul’s words. Finally, I dispute Crossan’s denial of the falsifiable of the bodily resurrection of Jesus.

Early Christians Believed in a Bodily Resurrection

The language of the miracle claim asserts that Jesus resurrected and appeared bodily to his disciples (John 20:27; Luke 24:39). However, a secular worldview primed by naturalism demands an alternative explanation of “what really happened” to Jesus other than a bodily resurrection.[2] The horns of the dilemma were posed by David F. Strauss (1808–1874), “either Jesus was not really dead, or he did not really rise again.”[3] However, all the details of passion-week Friday, such as, scourging, dehydration, crucifixion, etc., make any interpretation Jesus did not die to be “at odds with modern medical knowledge.”[4] The category of hallucination, as an explanation theory, is a popular attempt to claim the disciples hallucinated the bodily appearances of Jesus, and mass hysteria then spread their claim. As Dale C. Allison, Jr., frames it,

it was not the empty tomb that begot the hallucinations but hallucinations that begot the empty tomb.[5]

Dale C. Allison, Jr., Resurrecting Jesus (T&T Clark, 2005)

The charge is ancient. In the third-century AD, Origen of Alexandria (d. 254) combatted Celsus’ second-century claim that the disciples suffered a “delusion.”[6]

Another pushback against the orthodox view of a bodily resurrection is that it is just a fictional myth that developed over time as a result of a personal hallucination of Paul. To establish this claim, liberal Bible critic Crossan introduces the writings of two early non-Christian historians (Josephus and Tacitus) which he believes limit “what happened both before and after Jesus’s execution.” [7] Crossan argues their religious profiles of the Christian movement lack mention of the resurrection. Additionally, the Gospel of Thomas speaks of the “living Jesus” and the Epistle of Barnabas is void of resurrection talk. Crossan believes this evidence affirms that early Christian faith did not need to believe in a post-mortem appearance of Jesus. He further claims that Paul uses his experience of Jesus appearing to him (1 Cor 15:8) to give him the gravitas to be the equal of all the apostles in a political powerplay.[8]

Crossan’s novel hallucination theory also requires that the present passive indicative verb ōphthē, translated “appeared” in most translations, actually means “revealed.” This would be a culturally conditioned “trance” where Paul experienced an “altered state of consciousness” and used this personal experience to stabilize the infighting in the Corinthian church.[9] Crossan’s theory requires the church to have completely misread Paul’s testimony by taking his personal experience for apostolic orthodoxy. Crossan’s theory offers a “growth-politics” twist to the category of the hallucination theory.

The words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11, however, do not support Crossan’s theory. In fact, this passage is a test-case of the united shape of the earliest Christian tradition concerning the resurrection appearances of Jesus.[10] The minimal facts theory of apologist Gary R. Habermas provides a firm critical foundation to respond to Crossan. The minimal facts theory is a critical approach that uses “the minimal, best-established facts surrounding the appearances” of Jesus that even Bible critics grant “to determine what really happened after Jesus’ death.”[11] Habermas has established four historical facts.

First, there is very little controversy that Paul wrote 1 Corinthians, as even Crossan dates the letter to AD 53–54.[12] Second, Paul’s articulation of the gospel predates him, “I delivered to you… what I also received” (1 Cor 15:3). Here Paul affirms the normative nature of what he is preaching. Third, Paul received this “tradition” anywhere between AD 32–38, less than a decade after the crucifixion.[13] Fourth, this reception of the creed occurred during Paul’s Jerusalem information gathering “visit” (cf. historéō) with Peter and James (Gal 1:18–20) and anchors his tradition to the early Jerusalem church.[14]

Bible critical scholar, A. M. Hunter (1906–1991), argues that Paul claims in this passage “a very early Christian summary” of what the united apostolic voice affirms about the gospel and Jesus resurrection appearances (15:11);[15] namely, “that Christ died for our sins… that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day… and that he appeared” (15:3–5). The bodily death and resurrection appearances of Jesus legitimizes the existence of the Christian faith, for “in fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep” (15:20; cf. 15:6, 14). There is no powerplay. Paul is in fact arguing from within the earliest Christian tradition and meaning of resurrection appearance. This is a substantial point since Crossan’s theory offers a reinterpretation of the early Christian tradition which cannot be sustained internally.

Ultimately, a naturalistic argument forces Crossan’s hand to redefine what is a resurrection and how one experiences it. Resurrection was not, according to N. T. Wright, a generic term for “life after death” but instead “the second stage in a two-stage process of what happens after death: the first stage being nonbodily and the second being a renewed bodily existence… Paul really did believe in the bodily resurrection” (cf. 1 Cor 9:1).[16] It is precisely this firm belief in the bodily resurrection that invalidates Crosson’s theory for Paul, and is in conformity with other the New Testament descriptions of the bodily resurrection appearances of Jesus.[17]

Beyond the evidence of Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 of multiple eyewitnesses there are the public resurrection expectations and appearances in the Gospels; moreover, there are the resurrection creedal statements in the sermons of Acts.[18] It points to a clear unified belief among the earliest Christians that Jesus rose bodily from the dead and appeared in a renewed bodily existence. Bodily existence is the expected concept non-believers were to understand as the Christian view of the resurrection, as Judean Procurator Festus explains to Herod Agrippa II, “a certain Jesus, who was dead, but whom Paul asserted to be alive” (Acts 25:19; Acts 17:32). The New Testament evidence affirms, then, the early Christian claim that Jesus was a live again.

No Mechanism for Hallucination

As we shall argue, there are no cause for Paul to need a hallucination. Such a theory redefines the unified Christian claim of the bodily resurrection of Jesus. Crossan, keenly aware that Paul provides the earliest creedal statement, posits that Paul is the key for all the New Testament internal evidence. For Crossan what really happened is Paul was desperate to have a trance experience of the resurrection. He theorizes the Easter tradition developed over the years into its current boundaries of the canonical New Testament. Crossan offers “apparition–which involves trance” as the alternative dissociated state in which he believes Paul experienced resurrection.[19]

Based on the work by Erika Bourguignon on “dissociational” states, Crossan affirms trance to be “a human universal” that may be a culturally trained and controlled experience by one’s social and religious expectations.[20] Crossan’s reading of Paul’s words is an eisegetical fallacy importing a modern socio-religious model of an “altered state of consciousness” into Paul’s experiences to establish his political equality with the other apostles.[21] Again Crossan claims, “Paul needs… to equate his own experience” with the apostles to establish “its validity and legitimacy but not necessarily its mode or manner.”[22] Crossan’s methodology is problematic on this point.

However, there are three major problems with Crossan’s hallucination theory. First, Crossan imports an anachronistic definition into the use ōphthē in Paul’s words. It should be noted with significance that in the Greek Old Testament ōphthē is used in appearances of God (i.e., theophanies) to Abraham, and clearly to Abraham in bodily form where he ate with the Lord (Gen 18:1).[23] Paul was quite familiar with Genesis as he makes substantial arguments about justification by faith with the stories of Abraham in Galatians and Romans. To posit a modern theory while ignoring this Old Testament tradition of the verb, “he appeared,” ignores the textual evidence. Furthermore, it calls into question the validity of Crossan’s exegetical methodology.

Second, he exchanges his own meaning for Paul’s intended meaning of the verb ōphthē.[24] Crossan’s claim puts the power of the trance in Paul’s hands, but Paul’s verbal word choice indicates the appearance was out of his hands. Greek scholar, Daniel B. Wallace, reminds in grammatical instances like this, “volition rests wholly with the subject [Jesus], while the dative noun is merely recipient [Paul].”[25] It is Jesus who “appeared.” Paul did not conjure a “revelation” of Jesus.

Third, Crossan’s portrayal of Paul as desperate for apostolic power does not agree with Paul’s own success in Judaism prior to his conversion and call. He writes,

I was advancing in Judaism beyond many of my own age among my people, so extremely jealous was I for the traditions of my fathers. (Gal 1:13b–14)

Paul had the pedigree of a rising Jewish leader (Phil 3:4–8). There is no explainable mechanism which accounts for exchanging this advancement in Judaism for the trials of following Christ outside of an actual appearance of the resurrected Jesus which he did not initiate in a trance. Paul joins the pre-existing united voice of the apostolic witnesses, other earlier skeptical witnesses (non-believing siblings of Jesus), and the large groups seeing Jesus post-burial. Crossan’s theory do not adequately take these elements into account. Furthermore, Habermas’s minimal facts theory renders his mechanism historically implausible since its critical timetable places Paul as recipient, not creator, of the bodily resurrection confession.

Paul’s Claim was Falsifiable

This conclusion then leads to question of falsifiability. The early Christians claimed a dead man lived again. Writing about twenty years after the resurrection Paul asserts there were many eyewitnesses who could verify or falsify his claim that Jesus rose bodily. Paul wrote, “I delivered to you…what I also received” (1 Cor 15:2) and proceeds to outline six lines of eyewitness testimony evidence: Cephas, the twelve, over five hundred, James, all the apostles, and Paul. The most audacious claim is that Jesus appeared “to more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep” (1 Cor 15:6). Paul’s submission invites investigation into the genuineness of the resurrection of Jesus and is essential to Paul’s argument for the validity of the gospel. Paul’s claim to have “seen the Lord” is falsifiable (1 Cor 9:1). Even Crossan understands the surface argument of this passage, and observes, “no Jesus resurrection, no general resurrection; or, no general resurrection, no Jesus resurrection.”[26] He does not however believe it.

Crossan believes that it would be impossible to falsify the traditional empty tomb and resurrection stories. When asked whether “the empty tomb” was historical, Crossan emphatically responds, “No.” Crossan expands,

“I doubt there was any tomb for Jesus in the first place. I don’t think any of Jesus’ followers even knew where he was buried–if he was buried at all.”[27]

John Dominic Crossan in Who is Jesus? Answers to Your Question About the Historical Jesus (Westminster John Knox, 1996)

From Roman sources Crossan argues the Roman expectation for the crucified was the denial of both body and burial.[28] To the point, Crossan says, the “final penalty was to lie unburied as food for carrion birds and beasts [i.e., animals that eat decaying flesh].”[29] Crucifixion meant, then, “death-without-burial” and “body-as-carrion”; consequently, there was little likelihood of Jesus’ body making it off the cross let alone into the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea (Mark 15:42; Matt 27:1–61).[30] It would likely take “bribery, mercy, or indifference” to get the Romans to release the body over to a Jew seeking to avoid violating Jewish protocols of burying the hung (Deut 21:22–23).

Such a “hope” would be the exception, for only one contemporary crucified body remains have been found where thousands have been so executed; as such, it “is not history.”[31] This clearly undermines the Gospel tradition of the empty tomb where Jesus had been buried.

Crossan’s historical reconstruction of customary expectations and practices is a strong counterargument against falsification by the presentation of the cadaver of Jesus. If there is no body which survives the cross, there is no body to be buried, and therefore the Christian claim cannot be falsified. However, Crossan cannot historically rule out that Jesus was buried as Mark affirms. He can only suggest burial would be highly unlikely. Crossan’s alternative depends on advancing a legendary basis for the burial of Jesus. Yet, William Lane Craig responds this “would ignore the specific evidence” in Jesus’ case.[32] As established by the “minimal facts” critical theory, the creedal statement in 1 Corinthians 15:3–5 is very early. Furthermore, this four-line creedal formula affirms crucifixion, burial, resurrection, and then appearance.

The burial of Jesus was essential to the creed and Mark’s reference to it is substantial corroboration. First, the “assured results” of critical scholarship considers Mark the earliest gospel as it is the most “bare bones” narrative of Jesus.[33] Second, the Passion week narrative includes Jesus’ rejection and crucifixion. Third, Mark introduces Jesus’ burial in Joseph of Arimathea’s tomb from which he resurrects. Mark retains the burial tradition.[34] Crossan’s methodology is prejudicial because it rules out, beforehand (a priori), the established testimony of the earliest claim of the Christians: Christ was buried, was raised, and he appeared.

Conclusion

This paper affirms the bodily resurrection of Jesus over the challenge raised by the hallucination theory developed by Crossan. The language of the New Testament asserts that Jesus resurrected and appeared bodily to his disciples, to unbelievers, and to many others. Crossan claimed that the resurrection from the dead was not a main element of the Christian faith. However, a critical examination of the words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 verifies that the primary and earlier Christian creedal tradition which teaches that Jesus arose bodily and appeared. There is no other normative belief in the New Testament than Jesus resurrected from the dead.  

Second, Crossan’s trance mechanism for a hallucination imposes an anachronistic understanding on Paul’s words. The alternative theory offered by Crossan that Paul had a dissociative hallucination-trance experience to gain religious political power is based on seriously flawed exegetical methodology. There is ultimately no proper mechanism for Paul’s conversion to Christianity and his claim of seeing the resurrected Jesus, when he was living a successful Jewish life as a persecutor of the church. Paul’s claim that he saw the Lord resurrected must be taken seriously.

Finally, I asserted the early Christian claim of a bodily resurrection would have been falsifiable by the cadaver of Jesus. Crossan’s claim that Jesus’ body would likely never have survived nor made it to a burial actually is self-defeating because he cannot rule out known exceptions. In Jesus’ case, there were elements to his story that made it possible for Jesus to be taken off the cross and buried in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea. This is in keeping with the earliest Christian claim regarding his burial.


Endnotes

  1. Unless otherwise noted, all Scripture quotations are from the English Standard Version of The Holy Bible (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Bibles, 2016).
  2. Gary R. Habermas explains that a naturalist theory for the resurrection draws “from a host of philosophical backgrounds, the basic idea is to suggest an alternative explanation in place of divine causation… ‘Jesus didn’t rise from the dead. What really happened is (fill in the blank).’” Habermas, “The Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses to Jesus’ Resurrection,” Trinity Journal 22 (2001): 180.
  3. David F. Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, 4th edition, translated by George Eliot (London: Sonnenschein, 1902), 736. The longer form: “a dead man has returned to life, is composed of two such contradictory elements, that whenever it is attempted to maintain the one, the other threatens to disappear. If he has really returned to life, it is natural to conclude that he was not wholly dead; if he was really dead, it is difficult to believe that he has really become living” (735–36).
  4. William Edwards, Wesley J. Gabel, and Floyd E. Hosmer, “On the Physical Death of Jesus Christ,” Journal of the American Medical Association 255.11 (1986): 1436.
  5. Dale C. Allison, Jr., Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 204. Allison offers seven categories and sub-categories of resurrection appearance hypotheses each with different psychological catalysts (199–213).
  6. Origen Contra Celsum 2.60: “But Celsus, unwilling to admit any such view, will have it that some dreamed a waking dream, and, under the influence of a perverted imagination, formed to themselves such an image as they desired. Now it is not irrational to believe that a dream may take place while one is asleep; but to suppose a waking vision in the case of those who are not altogether out of their senses, and under the influence of delirium or hypochondria, is incredible. And Celsus, seeing this, called the woman half-mad,— a statement which is not made by the history recording the fact, but from which he took occasion to charge the occurrences with being untrue.”
  7. Josephus Antiquities 18.63; Tacitus Annals 15.44. cf. Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 161–62. Italics added.
  8. Crossan, Jesus, 166.
  9. Ibid., 167; 87–88.
  10. The following four arguments presume the work of Gary R. Habermas, “The Resurrection Appearances of Jesus,” In Defense of Miracles, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1997), 264.
  11. Habermas, “Resurrection Appearances,” 262.
  12. Possibly later, like 64. Stephen Neill and Tom Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament: 1861–1986, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University, 1988), 308; Crossan, Jesus, 163.
  13. C. H. Dodd argues that Paul’s first visit to Jerusalem was “not more than seven years after the Crucifixion,” The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments (reprint, New York: Harper & Brothers, n.d.), 16.
  14. William R. Farmer, “Peter and Paul and the Tradition Concerning ‘The Lord Supper’ in 1 Cor 11:23–26,” Criswell Theological Review 2.1 (1987): 122–28; Habermas, “Resurrection Appearances,” 265–67.
  15. A. M. Hunter, Jesus: Lord and Saviour (reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 99. John Dominic Crossan argues that Paul went to great pains to validate his own apostleship, yet, it was not the voice but a competing voice among many regarding the importance of the resurrection, Jesus, 159–92.
  16. N. T. Wright and John Dominic Crossan, “The Resurrection: Historical Event or Theological Explanation? A Dialogue,” The Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright in Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006), 17.
  17. 1 John 1:1–4; John 20:1–21:24; Acts 1:1–3, 2:29–32.
  18. Expectations: Matt 28:8–20; Luke 24:13–52; John 20:10–23, 26–30, 21:1–14; Mark 16:6–7; statements: 1:1–3; 2:23–24, 32; 3:15; 4:10; 10:41; 13:30–34; 17:31; 23:6; 24:21; 26:8, 23.
  19. Crossan, Jesus, 160–61. Italics are original.
  20. Ibid., 87–89.
  21. Ibid., 166–67; Acts 9:3–4, 22:6–7, 26:13–14.
  22. Ibid., 169.
  23. Genesis 12:7; 17:1; 18:1; 26:2, 24.
  24. The following argument is based on Daniel B. Wallace’s discussion of the dative + the present passive indicative form of ōphthē in the New Testament in his Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 165, footnote 72; “horáo,” Walter Bauer, Frederick W. Danker, William F. Ardnt, and F. Wilbur Gingrich A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 719.
  25. Wallace, Greek Grammar, 165. What Wallace says for Paul applies equally to all listed in 1 Corinthians 15:5–8: Cephas and the twelve, the “more than five-hundred,” and James and the apostles. Crossan, Jesus, 164.
  26. John Dominic Crossan and Richard G. Watts, Who is Jesus? Answers to Your Question About the Historical Jesus (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996), 122.
  27. Suetonius, Defied Augustus 13.1–2, Tacitus, Annals 6.29.
  28. John Dominic Crossan, Who Killed Jesus? Exposing the Roots of Antisemitism in the Gospel Story of the Death of Jesus (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 160.
  29. Crossan, Who Killed Jesus, 163. In Crossan’s perspective, Joseph of Arimathea is purely a construct of Mark’s imagination; see his discussion on Luke 23:50–54 and John 19:35–42.
  30. Crossan, Who Killed Jesus, 163–68.
  31. Lee Strobel, The Case for Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 208.
  32. Donald Guthrie, New Testament Introduction, 4th ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1990), 150.
  33. Strobel, Case for Christ, 209.

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